Abstract. Intrusion detection aims at raising an alarm any time the security of an IT system gets compromised. Though highly successful, Intrusion Detection Systems are all susceptible of mimicry attacks [1] . A mimicry attack is a variation of an attack that attempts to pass by as normal behaviour. In this paper, we introduce a method which is capable of successfuly detecting a significant and interesting sub-class of mimicry attacks. Our method makes use of a word network [2, 3] . A word network conveniently decomposes a pattern matching problem into a chain of smaller, noise-tolerant pattern matchers, thereby making it more tractable. A word network is realised as a finite state machine, where every state is a hidden Markov model. Our mechanism has shown a 93% of effectivity, with a false positive rate of 3%.
Introduction
Intrusion detection is concerned with the timely discovery of any activity that jeopardises the integrity, availability or the confidentiality of an IT system. It often amounts to detecting a known pattern of computer misuse, a deviation to ordinary, expected system behaviour, or a combination thereof. Regardless of which of these approaches is adopted, current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are easy to bypass with a mimicry attack.
A mimicry attack is a variant of an attack which aims to masquerade as normal behaviour [1] . A mimicry attack is built out of the original one using any conceivable transformation, provided that harmfulness is not lost. For example, at a host level, where an attack takes the form of a sequence of system calls, a mimicry attack is built using at least 3 transformations: i) replace a subsequence of system calls for other one, functionally equivalent; ii) swap two or more (subsequences of) independent system calls; and iii) randomly insert system calls that do not change the harmful intent of the attack.
In this paper, we introduce a host-based Misuse IDS (MIDS), capable of successfully detecting a great variety of mimicry attacks. The method makes use of a word network [2, 3] . A word network is a technique that aims to conveniently decompose a pattern matching problem into a chain of smaller, noise-tolerant pattern matchers, thereby making it more tractable. A word network is realised as a finite state machine, where every state is a hidden Markov model. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a doubly stochastic process, characterised by internal events that drive the model external behaviour in a random manner [4] .
To approach mimicry attack detection, we divided each of the attacks under consideration into n segments, each of which is the same size. We then built n HMM's, tailored to recognise the appearance of one of these segments, as well as of some of its variants. We built an HMM to recognise the appearance of spurious system calls that do not affect the harmfulness of the attack. We then linked all these HMM's properly, forming a word network capable of recognising mimicry attacks, while filtering spurious system calls. For all our experiments we used the "Hidden Markov Model Toolkit (HTK)". This software allows for large HMMs to be used and it also has the ability to use word networks.
Paper Overview
In what follows, we discuss the rationale behind using a word network for discriminating an ordinary sequence of system calls from an intrusion one ( §2). Then we describe the attacks targeted throughout our investigations ( §3) and show how to obtain their mimicries ( §4). Then we describe our methodology both for building ( §5) and for testing ( §6, §7) a word-network-based MIDS capable of detecting and attack and a number of their mimicries. Finally, we compare our results against rival techniques ( §8) and discuss the conclusions drawn from our experiments ( §9).
Sequence Analysis

Hidden Markov Models
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) captures hidden, internal events that generate an observable, external behaviour in a probabilistic manner. An HMM is a probabilistic generative model [4, 5] . It outputs a string moving through a discrete state space using Markov decisions indexed by time. At any time, the current state generates a symbol according to a probabilistic rule. An HMM takes two parameters: i) the transition probabilities and ii) the emission probabilities. At each state, the transition probabilities determine which state the HMM should move to, while the emission probabilities which symbol should be output.
An HMM has one or more starting and final states. Possible transitions are successively carried out from a starting state to a final one. Given an input sequence, the HMM computes all the HMM transition paths that could have yielded it, associating with each of them a path probability. This path probability is calculated multiplying the path transition probabilities and the emmision probabilities. The transition and emmision probabilities are calculated using the Baum-Welch Algorithm. The sum of all the path likelihoods is regarded as the overall likelihood that the sequence was generated by the HMM and is called the evaluation of the sequence. To perform such evaluation Viterbi algorithm is used. A detailed description of HMMs is out of the scope of this paper but the reader is refered to [6, 4, 5] for a complete description of the algorithms involved in training and decoding HMMs.
HMMs have been widely used in anomaly detection, e.g. [7] [8] [9] [10] . Roughly, an HMM is built for modelling sequences of system calls output by an ordinary system user. Then the HMM is made evaluate unseen system call sequences. Using the output probability, one may determine whether the sequence should be considered normal (if likely) or an anomaly (otherwise).
Word Networks
A word network is a pattern matching technique specially designed to recognise speech. It is realised by means of a directed graph. Each node is an HMM, aimed at detecting a word or a phoneme; node transitions capture word dependency [2, 3] . Using word networks, the analysis of a grammatical structure is made independent of the word detection process. Each HMM is built towards the detection of a single object regardless of the object position within the input sequence of symbols. Word networks are highly robust: noise or long silences may occur in between the phonemes an the word can still be recognised. Probabilities are usually attached to the arcs making the pattern recogniser more flexible.
A word network may have one or more silent states. A silent state, as the name suggests, yields no productions; it is virtual in that it is given a label but does not come with an HMM. A word network gracefully degrades into an HMM. Then, the word network consists of only three states, two of them being silent: the entry and the exit states. More complex word networks will have many arcs departing from any given node and thus different paths can be tested.
To calculate the probability of a sequence over a word network, a weight is assigned to each possible transition. The weight would be positive if it is to denote a partial pattern matching success, and negative otherwise.
To approach mimicry attack detection, we have divided each attack under consideration into n segments of fixed size. For every attack segment, we have built an HMM, tailored to recognise the appearance of it, as well as of some of its variants. We have also built an HMM to recognise the appearance of spurious system calls that do not affect the harmfulness of the attack. Properly linking all the HMM's associated with an attack, we have formed a word network capable of recognising a number of variants of an attacks, filtering out redundant system calls.
We have split each attack under consideration in segments of size 6. Tan and Maxion have found that 6 is the size of the smallest unique subsequence for the log files used by Forrest [8] . Thus, for any intrusion detection method to be effective, it must consider sequences of size 6 or larger; in symbols:
and 6−gram ⊂ 7−gram. While Forrest's log files and DARPA's are different, it is reasonable not to use an sliding window of size lesser than 6.
The Attack Database
In our experiments, we have used the attacks described in Kendall's thesis [11] , shown in table 1.
3 As working examples, we will use two known attacks to the Solaris operating system, Eject and FFB, reported in the DARPA repository [12] . 
The Eject Attack
The Eject attack exploits a buffer overflow in the eject utility, distributed within Sun Solaris 2.5. Removable media devices that do not have an eject button or that are managed by the Volume Management use the eject utility. Due to an insufficient bound checking of the arguments in the volume management library, libvolmgt.so.1, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of eject. If exploited, this vulnerability can be used to gain root access. The Eject attack consists of 4 steps: i) inject the exploit script to the victim's host computer; ii) compile the exploit script; iii) execute the compiled exploit script; and iv) use the root console. If the exploit script is already in the victim's host and if it has been compiled, then the first two steps become unnecessary. We will refer to the long version and to the short version of Eject as Eject 1 and as Eject 2 respectively.
The FFB Attack
The FFB attack exploits a buffer overflow in the ffbconfig utility, also distributed within Sun Solaris 2.5. ffbconfig configures the Creator Fast Frame Buffer (FFB) Graphics Accelerator, which is part of the FFB Configuration Software Package, SUNWffbcf. This software is used when the FFB Graphics accelerator card is installed. Due to an insufficient bound checking on the arguments, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of ffbconfig.
The attack follows an execution path similar to Eject. We also consider two versions of FFB. One, called Ffb 1, injects, compiles and then executes the exploit script; and the other, called Ffb 2, only executes the compiled exploit script.
On the Generation of Mimicry Attacks
We have generated a collection of mimicry attacks using the following 3 transformation methodology [1] :
S: System Call Substitution: Replace a sequence of system calls with other one, functionally equivalent. Often, newer versions of an operating system come with system calls that replace, or at least provide the same functionality of, one or more system calls from a previous version. Example system calls that can be replaced one another for the Sun Solaris operating system are the following:
1. read applied to a file, provided that the file is open, and mmap, followed by a memory access; and 2. sysinfo, with appropiate parameters, and getdomainname (sysinfo can also accomodate both gethostid and gethostname). I: System Call Interchange: Replace a sequence of system calls with any valid permutation of it. Two system calls are interchangeable, if neither their effect nor their execution depend one another. N: No-op Insertion: Insert a system call within the input sequence, provided that the inserted system call does not change the harmfulness of the attack. This kind of a redundant system call is sometimes called a no-op.
To uderstand how a mimicry attack is generated and how our methodology is applied we need to define how an attack is composed. When we refer to an attack it is the sequence of events that tka a system from a secure to an insecure state. Since we are working at host level the building blocks of an aattack or any program are system calls. Every attack is composed of a number of system calls which can be grouped in segments. Each segment is a small sequence of system calls, in our case each segment is composed of 6 systems calls which is the size of the window used to train our HMMs and to detect the attack. This window also defines the insertion points for no-ops.
Generating Base Mimicry Attack
Given the difficulty of detecting mimicry attacks, we first identified a subproblem, we call base, that is still of interest but that is more manageable. The base problem consists of detecting all the variants that can be generated from an attack using only transformations S and I. More formally, let Σ denote the set of system calls and Σ the set of sequences over Σ. Then, given an attack, A ∈ Σ , we aim to build an IDS capable of detecting a member of
While finite, V SI (A) is huge! Take, for example, a short attack like FFB, which is 192 system call long, and uniformly divide it into segments of size 8. We have found that on average each segment accepts 3 transformations, yielding 3 24 attack variations! To generate base mimicry attacks, we identified system calls that can be emulated by means of a sequence of other system calls. Some of these system calls, and their associated equivalent sequence, are shown in table 2. The number of variations that can be generated for the Eject and FFB attacks, using the S and I transformations, together with the system call equivalences given in table 2, is shown in table 3. This figure is obtained as follows: the number of segments subject to modification is equal to the number of attack segments that include a replaceable system call. The maximum number of attacks is then the number of possible values for a system call multiplied by the number of replaceable system calls. The numbers in the last column are calculated assuming an average of 3 possible values for each replaceable system call.
Clearly, if we were to detect mimicry attacks using a simple matching mechanism, the time to search the entire database would be prohibitively large, let alone storage space. 
Generating Full Mimicry Attacks
The full problem of detecting mimicry attacks is much more complicated, since what counts as a no-op depends on the attack. As Wagner and Soto have pointed out, almost any system call can be turned into a no-op. For instance, passing it an spurious value, any parameterised system call may become a no-op. In the Sun Solaris system, for example, many system calls take parameters that we can exploit, including pointers, memory addresses, file descriptors, uid's, pid's and gid's. System calls that cannot be turned into a no-op include exit, pause, vhangup, fork, alarm, and setsid, as they abandon the current session. Yet, not every unsuccessfully executed system call counts as a no-op. Consider the portion of the eject attack shown in figure 1 . The first occurrence of stat is part of the attack signature and specifically provides an address jump to the buffer overflow. The second occurrence of stat is however a no-op: it does not affect the effect of the attack. Note that, in particular, the value returned in both cases is failure. Thus, simply filtering out unsuccessfully executed system calls will not work as it modifies the attack signature. To get around this problem, we may consider other system call audit information but at the expense of computer resources. Conversely, not every successfully executed system call is not a no-op. For example, chdir with argument "." will always be successful but will not affect the effect of an attack.
We have identified a moderate collection of 210 no-op. With them, we have generated an attack data base. One third of it was used for building the word networks modelling each attack. The remaining, larger portion was used only for validation purposes. The modelling methodology is described in the following section.
Modelling Attacks Using Word Networks
Having built the attack database, we use a third part of it to build all the HMM's involved in the detection of each attack. Each group of HMM's was then linked properly forming the associated word network. Built this way, these word networks cannot deal with no-ops. Yet, they are an effective means for detecting base mimicry attacks.
To approach the general problem, we have built an automaton aimed at detecting the appearance of one or more occurrences of no-ops. Linking this automaton to an attack word network enables the network to recognise a mimicry attack, even if it comes along with an arbitrary number of no-ops inserted at the end of every attack segment (but not in between). The automaton ignores all the sequences of no-ops that are also part of the attack. This is to avoid confusion when parsing in parallel an attack segment node and a no-op node. Figure 2 portrays the architecture of the word network for the eject attack. Nodes labelled S1,. . . , SN represent the HMM's aimed at detecting the corresponding attack segments. Nodes labelled No-Op (1),. . . , No-Op(M) are part of the automaton, built to filter out no-ops. All the no-ops can be combined in a single HMM for optimization. Table 4 contains a piece of the grammar that generates the word network for Eject. There, we use strings starting with $ to denote variables, brackets, { }, to denote the reflexive-transitive closure of sequence construction, and use square brackets, [ ], to denote the optional appearance of the enclosed symbol. Table 4 . A grammar corresponding to the eject attack word network.
$no-op = no-op1|no-op2| . . . |no-opm; $code insertion = eject-s1 {$no-op} eject-s2 {$no-op} . . . eject-si; $code execution = eject-sj {$no-op} eject-sj+1 {$no-op} . . . eject-sn;
We use the same word network to evaluate Eject 1 and Eject 2, only that the entry point is different. Upon evaluation, results yielded by any HMM node will contribute positively to the total outcome of the word network. Conversely, results yielded by the no-op automaton will contribute negatively, represented as a small penalisation.
The same HMMs can be used for other attacks, they serve as building blocks since the variations for the same segment, will be the same, regardless the attack it belongs to. Word networks can also be used to organise all our misuse database in the same place and only calculate the most likely path of an attack.
Since training data is sparse, training time is reasonably short. For a word network with 110 HMMs with up to 3 6 training sequences of 6 system calls for each HMM, and each HMM with 115 states, training time was about 120 minutes. We also trained each HMM with 250 states and the training time was about 300 minutes. All the tests were made on a PIV HT @ 2.6 GHz with 1 GB of dual channel RAM @ 400MHz running Linux Mandrake 9.0.
Base Validation Experiments
This section summarises the results output by two tests run on our IDS. One test, the false positive test, involves non-attack sessions, gathered from the DARPA repository and the other, the false negative test, involves the mimicry attacks that we generated using Wagner and Soto's methodology. For the false positive test, we randomly picked 2000 non-attack sessions coming from 4 different services: telnet (800), smtp (1000), ftp (50) and finger (150). For the false negative test, we picked 2500 unseen variants of each attack. With this size, the sample is representative with a 97.5% confidence.
On average, the IDS true positive rate is 98% while the false positive one is about 10%. These results were obtained using a 90% similarity threshold. Setting this threshold up to 95% causes a reduction in the false positive rate, from 10% to 3% on the average. Yet, the true positive rate is also reduced, from 98% to 93%. Table 5 summarises the results we obtained for each attack. Table 5 . Detection and false positive rates with different similarity thresholds. S and F P respectively stand for similarity and false positive rate.
Attack Name Detection % F P % Detection % F P % S=90% S=90% S=95% S=95% It is worth mentioning that false positive detections arose out of sessions belonging to the same service. If an HMM is trained to detect a telnet attack then only telnet sessions yield a false positive. The high false positive rate is because an attack is usually present in a small fragment of a session; therefore the rest of the session used to train the HMM might contain normal segments. This will cause the HMM to detect a normal session as an attack.
General Validation Experiments
For the general problem, we also run two tests on our IDS; one is the false positive test and the other the false negative one. The false positive test set was built the same way as for the base case. The false negative test set, however, was built slightly different.
Since the number of distinct attack variants that can be possibly built inserting no-ops is infinite, we limit ourselves to a subclass that considers the insertion of 10 different randomly generated sequences of no-ops between each attack segment. This subclass is still important because it includes some context-dependant no-ops, and no-ops derived from system calls returning failure. In both cases a normalisation is not possible. With a data base of 2,500 variations for each attack, we may produce 25,000 different attacks for the general case of mimicry attacks. With this sample size, the sample is representative with a 99.2% of confidence.
In our experiments, our IDS showed capable of detecting a significant subclass of the mimicry attacks with 92% of accuracy. The false positive detection rate is high: about 4% of the sequences were wrongfully labelled as an attack. The increment on the false positive rate over modified attacks without inserted noops was to be expected. The noise that the no-ops insert to the model gets in the way of a correct discrimination. Table 6 summarise our results. For all our experiments we used the "Hidden Markov Model Toolkit (HTK)". This software allows for large HMMs to be used and it also has the ability to use word networks. HTK can be found at http://htk.eng.cam.ac.uk/, whereas the HTK file format and word network definitions we used in our HMMs are described in [2] .
Related Work
Warrender, Forrest and Pearlmutter have built an AIDS using an HMM [7] . Their method uses a sliding window of size 6, with which they take an observation of current user behaviour and then compare it against the profile of that user's ordinary behaviour. If the input observation and the profile do not match, an alarm is triggered. Warrender et al report a true positive rate of 96.6%. Other researchers, e.g. [9, 10, 8] , have also explored the use of HMMs to intrusion detection, improving only slightly Warrender et al's results.
Tan and Maxion have shown that the size of the window, meaning the depth of the grammar, that Warrender et al is actually the minimal for an anomaly to be detected [8] . However, Wagner and Soto have disagreed with this result, demonstrating that a sliding window of size 6 is insufficient to detect a lot of mimicry attacks [1] .
Giffin, Jha and Miller approach mimicry attack detection using a static analysis of the application(s) to be protected [13] . The model is extremely precise, it yields a high true positive and a low false positive one, but at the expense of modifying every application and having a monitor to watch over the appearance of a (sequence of) system call(s) which is not accounted for the model. Slightly related to detecting mimicry attacks, detecting masqueraders has captured increasing interest within the community. On their seminal work, Schonlau et al [14] analyse the performance of various masquerader detection methods. They analyse six distinct detection methods: Uniqueness, Bayes 1-Step Markov, Hybrid Multi-Step Markov, Compression, IPAM and Sequence-Match. These methods are all anomaly detection methods and use sets of user commands to build profiles of normal user behaviour. Uniqueness is the most informed method, as not only does it use the profile of a given user but it also uses the profile of the others.
An alternative method, proposed by [15] , uses naïve Bayes to estimate the probability that a command c can be issued by user u. This method builds a profile for a user, so-called self, from a set of training data. The self of other users is then taken as the user's non-self. This method shows a detection rate of 61.5% and a false positive rate of 1.5%.
An alternative way of approaching mimicry detection is proposed by [16] . The method is based on a widely used technique for the comparison of genetic material, e.g. DNA or RNA. The method aims at detecting how well two sequences align one another and thus how similar they are. However, if enough no-ops are inserted within an attack, this alignment test is more likely to return true. The technique assigns a small penalty for gaps occurring between normal user commands. The gaps are non-matching objects in the sequence. This allows to deal with no-ops, but the larger number of noops, the lower the alignment score. The authors reported a detection ratio of 75.8%, and false positive rate is 7.7%.
A recursive data mining approach is proposed by [17] . It recursively extracts repetitive sequences, and replaces them by a new symbol until no repetitive patterns are left. After the substitution, different features are extracted, such as the number of distinct patterns, the number of repetitive patterns, the frequency of repetition of each distinct pattern, the reduction factor, etc. Then, a support vector machine is trained using user patterns as negative examples and other patterns as positive ones. The authors report a detection rate of 68% and a false positive rate of 9%.
These approaches all have the same limitation: they are all susceptible to overlook mimicry attacks. By contrast, our approach is able to detect a wider class of mimicry attacks thanks to the use of word networks, which provide a way to sequence matching decomposition.
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a method which is capable of successfuly detecting a significant and interesting sub-class of mimicry attacks. Our method makes use of a word network [2, 3] . A word network conveniently decomposes a pattern matching problem into a chain of smaller pattern matchers, thereby making it more tractable. A word network is realised as a finite state machine, where every state is a hidden Markov model. The use of word networks to mimicry attack detection is promising and more research should be conducted.
